We consider a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which one of the players has a private information on the game. Both players observe each other, so that the non-informed player can try to guess his missing information. Our aim is to quantify the amount of information the informed player has to reveal in order to play optimally: to do so, we show that the value function of this zero-sum game can be rewritten as a minimization problem over some martingale measures with a payoff given by the solution of a backward stochastic differential equation.
Introduction
In this paper we consider a two player zero-sum game, where the underlying dynamics are given by a diffusion with controlled drift but uncontrolled (non-degenerate) volatility. The game can take place in I different scenarios for the running cost and the terminal outcome as in a classical stochastic differential game. Before the game starts one scenario is picked with the probability p = (p i ) i∈{1,...,I} ∈ ∆(I). The information is transmitted only to Player 1. So at the beginning he knows in which scenario he is playing, while Player 2 only knows the probability p. It is assumed that both players observe the actions of the other one, so Player 2 might infer from the actions of his opponent in which scenario the game is actually played. It has been proved in Cardaliaguet and Rainer [6] that this game has a value. To investigate the game under the perspective of information transmission we establish an alternative representation of this value. We achieve this by directly modeling the amount of information the informed player reveals during the game. To that end we enlarge the canonical Wiener space to a space which carries besides a Brownain motion, càdlàg martingales with values in ∆(I). These martingales can be interpreted as possible beliefs of the uninformed player, i.e. the probability in which scenario the game is played in according to his information at time t. The very same ansatz has been used in the case of deterministic differential games in Cardaliaguet and Rainer [7] , while the original idea of the so called a posteriori martingale can already be found in the classical work of Aumann and Maschler (see [2] ). Bearing in mind the ideas of Hamadène and Lepeltier [14] we show that the value of our game can be represented by minimizing the solution of a backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) with respect to possible beliefs of the uninformed player. A cornerstone in the investigation of stochastic differential games has been laid by Fleming and Souganidis in [12] who extend the results of Evans and Souganidis [11] to a stochastic framework.
Therein it is shown that under Isaacs condition the value function of a stochastic differential game is given as the unique viscosity solution of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equation. The theory of BSDE, which was originally developped by Peng [17] for stochastic control theory, has been introduced to stochastic differential games by Hamadène and Lepeltier [14] and Hamadène, Lepeltier and Peng [15] . The former results have been extended to cost functionals defined by controlled BSDEs in Buckdahn and Li [3] , where the admissible control processes are allowed to depend on events occurring before the beginning of the game. The study of games with incomplete information has its starting point in the pioneering work of Aumann and Maschler (see [2] and references given therein). The extension to stochastic differential games has been given in Cardaliaguet and Rainer [6] . The proof is accomplished introducing the notion of dual viscosity solutions to the HJI equation of a usual stochastic differential game, where the probability p just appears as an additional parameter. A different unique characterization via the viscosity solution of the HJI equation with an obstacle in the form of a convexity constraint in p is given in Cardaliaguet [5] . We use this latter characterization in order to prove our main representation result. The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we describe the game and restate the results of [6] and [5] which build the basis for our investigation. In section 3 we give our main theorem and derive the optimal behaviour for the informed player under some smoothness condition. The whole section 4 is devoted to the proof of the main theorem, while the appendix provides some proofs of extensions to classical BSDE results, which are necessary for our case.
Setup 2.1 Formal description of the game
Let C([0, T ]; R d ) be the set of continuous functions from R to R d , which are constant on (−∞, 0] and on [T, +∞). We denote by B s (ω B ) = ω B (s) the coordinate mapping on C([0, T ]; R d ) and define H = (H s ) as the filtration generated by s → B s . We denote Ω t = {ω ∈ C([t, T ]; R d ) and H t,s the σ-algebra generated by paths up to time s in Ω t . Furthermore we provide C([0, T ]; R d ) with the Wiener measure P 0 on (H s ).
In the following we investigate a two-player zero-sum differential game starting at a time t ≥ 0 with terminal time T . The dynamics are given by a controlled diffusion on (C( 
We assume that the controls of the players u, v can only take their values in some set U , V respectively, where U, V are compact subsets of some finite dimensional spaces. Let ∆(I) denote the simplex of R I . The objective to optimize is characterized by
which are chosen with probability p ∈ ∆(I) before the game starts. Player 1 chooses his control to minimize, Player 2 chooses his control to maximize the expected payoff. We assume both players observe their opponents control. However Player 1 knows which payoff he maximizes, Player 2 just knows the respective probabilities p i for scenario i ∈ {1, . . . , I}. The following will be the standing assumption throughout the paper. Assumption (H)
is bounded and continuous in all its variables and Lipschitz continuous with respect to (t, x) uniformly in (u, v). is bounded and Lipschitz continuous with respect to (t, x). 
By assumption (H) the Hamiltonian H is Lipschitz in (ξ, p) uniformly in (t, x) and Lipschitz in (t, x) with Lipschitz constant c(1 + |ξ|), i.e. it holds for all t, t
and 
Strategies and value function

is denoted by V(t).
In differential games with complete information as in [12] it is sufficient, that one player chooses at the beginning an admissible control and the other one chooses the optimal reaction to it. In our case the uniformed player tries to infer from the actions of his opponent in which scenario the game is played and adapts his behavior to his beliefs. Thus a permanent interaction has to be allowed. To this end it is necessary to restrict admissible strategies to have a small delay in time.
Definition 2.2. A strategy for Player 1 at time
The set of strategies for Player 1 is denoted by A(t). The definition of strategies β :
Player 2 is similar. The set of strategies for Player 2 is denoted by B(t).
Next we state a slight modification of Lemma 5.1. [6] Lemma 2.3. One can associate to each pair of strategies (α, β) ∈ A(t) × B(t) a unique couple of admissible controls
The proof is done via a fixed point argument using the delay property of the strategies.
Furthermore it is crucial that the players are allowed to choose their strategies with a certain additional randomness. Intuitively this can be explained by the incentive of the players to hide their information. Thus for the evaluation of a game with incomplete information we introduce random strategies. To this end let I denote a set of probability spaces which is non trivial and stable by finite product.
Definition 2.4.
A random strategy for Player 1 at time t ∈ [0, T [ is a a pair ((Ω α , G α , P α ), α), where (Ω α , G α , P α ) is a probability space in I and α :
where Ω α is equipped with the σ-field G α ,
(ii) there exists δ > 0 such that for all s ∈ [t, T ] and for any f, f
The set of random strategies for Player 1 is denoted by A r (t). The definition of random strategies ((Ω β , G β , P β ), β), where β :
Player 2 is similar. The set of random strategies for Player 2 is denoted by B r (t).
Remark 2.5. Again one can associate to each couple of random strategies (α, β) ∈ A r (t) × B r (t) for any (ω α , ω β ) ∈ Ω α × Ω β a unique couple of admissible strategies (u
where (5) should be understood in the following way. As in Remark 2.5. we associate toᾱ i , β for any
The process X t,x,ᾱi,β is then defined for any (ωᾱ i , ω β ) as solution to (1) with the associated controls. Furthermore Eᾱ i ,β is the expectation on Ωᾱ i × Ω β × C([t, T ]; R d ) with respect to the probability Pᾱ i ⊗ P β ⊗ P 0 , where
Under assumption (H) the existence of the value of the game is proved in a more general setting in [6] .
the value of the game with incomplete information V (t, x, p) is given by V (t, x, p) = infᾱ ∈(A r (t)) I sup β∈B r (t) J(t, x, p,ᾱ, β) = sup β∈B r (t) infᾱ ∈(A r (t)) I J(t, x, p,ᾱ, β).
(6)
Remark 2.7. It is well known (e.g. [6] Lemma 3.1) that it suffices for the uninformed player to use admissible (non-random) strategies if he plays first. Intuitively since he has no information to hide. So we can use in (6) the easier expression
The existence and uniqueness of the value function [6] using the concept of dual viscosity solutions to HJI equations. Starting from this a characterization of the value function as solution of an obstacle problem is given in [5] . 
Az, z |z| 2 .
and T ∆(I)(p) denotes the tangent cone to
Remark 2.9. Note that unlike the standard definition of viscosity solutions (see e.g. [8] ) the subsolution property to (8) is required only on the interior of ∆(I) while the supersolution property to (8) is required on the whole domain ∆(I) (see [5] and [7] ). This is due to the fact that we actually consider viscosity solutions with a state constraint, namely p ∈ ∆(I) R I . For a concise investigation of such problems we refer to [4] .
We do not go into detail about the rather technical proof of Theorem 2.7. in [5] . However there is an easy intuitive explanation of the convexity constraint, which we give in the following remark.
We consider the game in two steps. First the initial distribution for the game with incomplete information p 1 , p 2 is picked with probability (1 − λ), λ. If the outcome is transmitted only to Player 1, the value of this game is
On the other hand we consider the game in which both players are told the outcome of the pick of the initial distribution p 1 , p 2 . The expected outcome of this game is (1 − λ)V (t, x, p 1 ) + λV (t, x, p 2 ). In the first game the informed player knows more, hence, if we make the rather reasonable assumption that the value of information is positive, we have
3 Alternative representation of the value function
Enlargement of the canonical space
In the following we establish a representation of the value function by enlarging the canonical Wiener space to a space which will carry besides a Brownain motion a new dynamic. We use this additional dynamic to model the incorporation of the private information into the game. More precisely we model the probability in which scenario the game is played in according to the information of the uniformed Player 2. 
and F t,s the σ-algebra generated by paths up to time s in Ω t . Furthermore we define the space
and denote πω = (ω 1 , ω 2 ). The map π :
, where the inverse is defined in an evident way.
For any measure P on Ω, we denote by E P [·] the expectation with respect to P. We equip Ω with a certain class of measures.
Definition 3.1. Given p ∈ ∆(I), t ∈ [0, T ], we denote by P(t, p) the set of probability measures P on Ω such that, under P 
, is due to the best guess of the uniformed player about the scenario he is in. Finally, at the end of the game the information is revealed hence p T ∈ {e i , i = 1, . . . , I} and since the scenario is picked before the game starts the outcome p T is independent of the Brownian motion.
BSDEs for stochastic differential games with incomplete information
An alternative representation of the value of the game is given in [7] in a simpler setting by directly minimizing the expectation of the Hamiltonian over a similar class of martingale measures P. In our case the drift of the diffusion is controlled by the players, hence the Hamiltonian (2) depends on the first derivative of the value function and a "direct" representation is not possible.
Inspired by the ideas of [14] we use the theory of BSDE to solve this problem. To that end we introduce the following spaces. For any p ∈ ∆(I), t ∈ [0, T ] and fixed P ∈ P(t, p) we denote by L 2 T (P) the set of a square integrable F T -measurable random variables. We define by H 2 (P) the space of all predictable processes θ such that
s ds < ∞, and I 2 (P) = θdB : θ ∈ H 2 (P) . Furthermore we denote by M 2 0 (P) the space of square integrable martingales null at zero. In the following we shall identify any N ∈ M 2 0 (P) with its càdlàg modification.
Let p ∈ ∆(I). We consider for each P ∈ P(t, p) the BSDE
where N ∈ M 2 0 (P) is strongly orthogonal to I 2 (P).
Existence and uniqueness results for the BSDE (10) can be found in more generality in [10] . Our case is much simpler, since the driver does not depend on the jump parts. This significantly simplifies the proofs which we give for the reader's convenience in the appendix. Note in particular that as in the standard case we can establish a comparison principle (Theorem A.4.), which will be crucial in our further calculations.
Theorem 3.3. Under the assumption (H) the BSDE (10) has a unique solution
In particular it holds
Note that all P ∈ P(t, p) are equal on F t− , i.e. the distribution of (B s , p s ) s ∈ [0, t[ is given by δ(p) ⊗ P 0 , where δ(p) is the measure under which p is constant and equal to p and P 0 is a Wiener measure. So we can identify each P ∈ P(t, p) on F t− with a common probability measure Q and define
The aim of this paper is to show the following alternative representation for the value function.
the value of the game with incomplete information V (t, x, p) can be characterized as
We give the proof in the section 4, where we first show that W (t, x, p) is a deterministic function. Then we establish a Dynamic Programming Principle and show that W (t, x, p) is a viscosity solution to (8) . Since V (t, x, p) is by Theorem 2.8. uniquely defined as the viscosity solution to (8) the equality is immediate. Before, let us first investigate under smoothness assumptions a possible behavior of an optimal measure and show how the representation is related to the original game.
A sufficient condition for optimality
Next we give a sufficient condition for a P ∈ P(t, p) to be optimal in (13) . We assume
In the theory of games with incomplete information the set H is usually called the non-revealing set. This is due to the fact that on H the value function fullfills the standard HJI equation, hence the informed player is not "actively" using his information because the belief of the uniformed player stays unchanged.
ThenP is optimal for V (t, x, p).
Remark 3.6. The analysis of the deterministic case in [7] indicates that the conditions (i) and (ii) might also be necessary even in the non-smooth case. In fact under certain assumtions the conditions (i)-(iii) of Theorem 3.5. can expected to be necessary and sufficient. (See [7] Example 4.4.)
Proof: By definition V (T, x, p) = g(x), p . Since V ∈ C 1,2,2 and p is purely discontinuous we have by Itô's formula and the assumptions (i)-(iii)
is the unique solution to the BSDE (10). We have in particular
hence the result follows from taking conditional expectation and the representation in Theorem 3.4.
Optimal information reveal for the informed player
Our aim is to quantify the amount of information the informed player has to reveal in order to play optimally. Note that in the representation we consider as in [14] the original game under a Girsanov transformation. Hence an optimal measure in (13) gives an information structure of the game only up to a Girsanov transformation, which we have to reverse to get back to our original problem.
. LetP ∈ P(t, p), such that the conditions of Theorem 3.6. are fulfilled, hence Z t,x,P s
Thanks to Isaacs condition, assumption (H) (iv), one can define the function u * (t, x, p, ξ) as a Borel measurable selection of argmin u∈U {max v∈V b(t, x, u, v), ξ +
We define the processū
where by definitionū is progressively measurable with respect to the filtration (F t,s ) s∈[t,T ] with values in U . In the following we will denote the set of such processes the set of relaxed controlsŪ(t) and the set of progressively measurable processes with respect to the filtration (F t,s ) s∈[t,T ] with values in V the set of relaxed controlsV(t).
We consider for each relaxed control v ∈V(t) the (F)BSDE
Theorem 3.7. For any v ∈V(t) we have
Proof: Since
follows from the comparison Theorem A.4.
As in [14] we define now for any v ∈V(t) the equivalent measurePū ,v = (Γū
whereB is aPū ,v -Brownian motion.
(ii) p is aPū ,v martingale, such that p s = p ∀s < t, p s ∈ {e i , i = 1, ..., I} ∀s ≥ T Pū For any β ∈ B(t), i.e. β :
is nonanticipative with delay, we can define the process β(ū) s = β(s, ·,ū s ). By definition β(ū) is a V -valued process which is progressively measurable with repect to the filtration F t,s hence β(ū) ∈V(t). So we can define for any β ∈ B(t) the measurePū ,β(ū) .
To take into account that the informed player knows the scenario, we define now for any scenario i ∈ {1, . . . , I} and for any β ∈ B(t) a probability measurePū
. Note that by Lemma 3.9.
(ii)B is aPū is optimal for the informed player in the sense that for any β ∈ B(t)
Proof: By definition we have
where in the last step we used the product rule for thePū ,β(ū) -martingale p and the adapted finite variation process
So since by Theorem 3.7. Y t,x,ū,β(ū) t− ≤ V (t, x, p)P-a.s. andP is equivalent toPū ,β(ū) , we have
Remark 3.10. In the simpler case of [7] the representation (13) allowed to derive an optimal random control for the informed player in a direct feedback from. Here however there are significant differences. By the Girsanov transformation we have for each β ∈ B(t) at each time s ∈ [t, T ] an optimal reaction
s , p s ), p s ) of the informed player. It depends on the state of the system, i.e. X t,x underPū ,β(ū) i and the shifted randomization p under the optimal measurePū ,β(ū) i . Since this shift depends on the strategy β of the uniformed player, we do not find a random control but a kind of random strategy for the informed player. Note that this "strategy" -none of the less giving us a recipe how the informed player can generate the optimal information flow -is in general not of the form required in definition 2.4. To get a classical random strategy it would be necessary to show a certain structure of the optimal measureP. In a subsequent paper we show how this can be established for ǫ-optimal measures leading to ǫ-optimal strategies in the sense of definition 2.4.
(ii) if there is another random variable η such that η ≤ Y t,x,P t− , Q-a.s., for any P ∈ P(t, p), then η ≤ ξ, Q-a.s.
So by its very definition W (t, x, p) is merely a F t− measurable random field. However we show that it is deterministic and hence a good candidate to represent the deterministic value function V (t, x, p). Our proof is mainly based on the methods in [3] .
Hence identifying W (t, x, p) with its deterministic version E Q [W (t, x, p)] we can consider W :
To prove that W (t, x, p) is deterministic it suffices to show that it is independent of the σ-algebra σ ( 
Proof: Obviously τ h , τ
Step 1:
which is the original BSDE (10) 
Step 2: We claim that
Observe that the law of τ h is given by
for all measures P on Ω. Define I(t, x, p) = essinf
Step 3: Using (24) and (25) we have Q-a.s.
the process B is no longer a Brownian motion on [0, t].We define P h on Ω = Ω 0,t × Ω t , such that 
Furthermore the remaining conditions of Definition 3.1. are obviously met. Hence P h ∈ P(t, p) and,
On the other hand by considering P • τ h one can associate to any P ∈ P(t, p) a
: P ∈ P(t, p) and
Proposition 3.6. follows then by Lemma 4.1. in [3] .
In the following section we establish some regularity results and a dynamic programming principle.
To this end we work with ǫ-optimal measures. Note that since we are taking the essential infimum over a family of random variables, existence of an ǫ-optimal P ǫ ∈ P(t, p) is not standard. Therefore we provide a technical lemma, the proof of which is also strongly inspired by [3] .
there is an ǫ-optimal P ǫ ∈ P(t, p) in the sense that
Proof: Note that there exists a sequence (P n ) n∈N , P n ∈ P(t, p), such that
For an ǫ > 0 set Γ n := {W (t, x, p) + ǫ ≥ Y t,x,P n t− } ∈ F t− for any n ∈ N. ThenΓ 1 := Γ 1 ,Γ n := Γ n \ (∪ m=1,...,n−1Γm ) for n ≥ 2 form a F t− measurable partition of Ω. We define P ǫ , such that on Ω = Ω 0,t × Ω t 
Again the remaining conditions of Definition 3.1. are obviously met. Thus P ǫ ∈ P(t, p) and it holds
Some regularity results
For technical reasons we will consider the BSDE (10) with a slightly different notation. For any
then gives the solution to (10) . In the following we will use the notation Y t,x,P s = Y t,x s , z t,x,P = z t,x , whenever we work under a fixed P ∈ P(t, p). Remark 4.4. Observe that by (H) we have thatH is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in (ξ, p) uniformly in (t, x) and Lipschitz continuous in (t, x) with Lipschitz constant c(1 + |ξ|), i.e. it holds for all t, t
and
Proposition 4.5. W (t, x, p) is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in x and uniformly Hölder continuous in t.
Proof: For the Lipschitz continuity in x, assume W (t, x ′ , p) − W (t, x, p) > 0 and let P ǫ ∈ P(t, p) be ǫ-optimal for W (t, x, p) for a sufficiently small ǫ. Then, since W (t, x ′ , p), W (t, x, p) are deterministic, we have by Hölder inequality and Proposition A.3.
For the Hölder continuity in time, let t, t ′ ∈ [0, T ] such that t ′ ≤ t and assume W (t ′ , x, p) > W (t, x, p). Let P ǫ ∈ P(t, p) be ǫ-optimal for W (t, x, p) for a sufficiently small ǫ. Note that since t ′ ≤ t it holds P ǫ ∈ P(t ′ , p). Then, since W (t ′ , x, p), W (t, x, p) are deterministic, we have by Hölder inequality and Proposition A.3.
For the case t ′ ≤ t, W (t ′ , x, p) < W (t, x, p) choose a P ǫ ∈ P(t ′ , p), which is ǫ-optimal for W (t ′ , x, p) for a sufficiently small ǫ. We define then the probability measureP ǫ , such that on Ω = Ω 0,t × Ω t
where δ(p) denotes the measure under which p is constant and equal to p and P 0 is a Wiener measure on Ω 0,t . So by definition (B s ) s∈[t,T ] is a Brownian motion underP ǫ . Furthermore the remaining conditions of Definition 3.1. are met, henceP ǫ ∈ P(t, p) and the same argument as above applies in that case. Proof: To show the convexity in p let p 1 , p 2 ∈ ∆(I) and let P 1 ∈ P(t, p 1 ), P 2 ∈ P(t, p 2 ) be ǫ-optimal for W (t, x, p 1 ), W (t, x, p 2 ) respectively. For λ ∈ [0, 1] define a martingale measure P λ ∈ P(t, p λ ), such that for all measurable φ :
Observe that we just take two copies Ω 1 , Ω 2 of the same space with weights λ, (1 − λ). So for the respective solutions of the BSDE (27) it holds
and the convexity follows by taking expectation, since ǫ can be chosen arbitrarily small. Next we prove the uniform Lipschitz continuity in p. Since we have convexity in p, it suffices to show the Lipschitz continuity with respect to p on the extreme points e i . Observe that P(t, e i ) consists in the single probability measure δ(e i ) ⊗ P 0 , where δ(e i ) is the measure under which p is constant and equal to e i and P 0 is a Wiener measure. Assume W (t, x, p) − W (t, x, e i ) > 0 and let P ǫ ∈ P(t, p) be ǫ-optimal for W (t, x, p) for a sufficiently small ǫ. Then
By the uniform Lipschitz continuity ofH in ξ and p it holds
where we used the estimate
We defineŶ as the unique solution to the BSDÊ
Then by comparison (Theorem A.4.) we have
This follows directly by applying the Itô folmula
which is by the definition of P(t, p) strongly orthogonal to I 2 (P ǫ ). Furthermore
It is well known (see e.g. [9] ) that, the solutionỸ to (30) is continuous, bounded in L 1 andỸ t is deterministic. SoỸ t− =Ỹ t ≤ c and we have
Dynamic Programming Principle
Next we show that a dynamic programming principle holds. To that end we introduce the set P f (t, p) as the set of all measures P ∈ P(t, p), such that there exists a finite set S ⊂ ∆(I) with p s ∈ S P-a.s. for all s ∈ [t, T ]. It is well known (see e.g. [18] Theorem II.4.10) that P f (t, p) is dense in P(t, p) with respect to the weak * topology.
Since P f (t, p) is a dense subset of P(t, p) with respect to the weak * topology, it suffices to show
For the proof of Theorem 4.7. we first show two Lemmas.
Proof: Fix P ∈ P f (t, p) and t ′ ∈ [t, T ]. Let (A l ) l∈N be a partition of R d in Borel sets, such that diam(A l ) ≤ ǫ and choose for any l ∈ N some y l ∈ A l . Let z t ′ ,y l denote the z term of the solution of BSDE (27) with forward dynamics X
where by Hölder inequality, Proposition A.3. and Gronwall inequality while by (ii) and Lemma 4.8.
Proof: (Theorem 4.7.) Let P ǫ ∈ P f (t, p) be ǫ-optimal for W (t, x, p). Then by Lemma 4.8.
To prove the reverse inequality choose P ǫ1 ∈ P f (t, p) to be ǫ 1 optimal for the RHS of (32), i.e.
Furthermore choose as in Lemma 4.9. for P ǫ1 a P ǫ1,2 ∈ P f (t, p) to be ǫ 2 optimal. Then by (35), (36)
Finally combining (37), (38) we have
Viscosity solution property
To proof that W is a viscosity solution to (8) we first show the subsolution property which is an easy consequence of the Dynamic Programming Theorem 4.7.
Proposition 4.11. W is a viscosity subsolution to (8) 
Proof: Let φ : [0, T ]×R d ×∆(I) → R be a test function such that W −φ has a strict global maximum at (t,x,p) with W (t,x,p) − φ(t,x,p) = 0 andp ∈ Int(∆(I)). We have to show, that
holds at (t,x,p). By Proposition 4.6. W is convex in p. So sincep ∈ Int(∆(I)), it holds λ min which implies (39) as t ↓t by standard results (see e.g. [9] ). Proposition 4.12. W is a viscosity supersolution to (8) 
→ R be a smooth test function, such that W − φ has a strict global minimum at (t,x,p) with W (t,x,p) − φ(t,x,p) = 0 and such that its derivatives are uniformly Lipschitz in p. We have to show, that
holds at (t,x,p). Observe that, if λ min
≤ 0 at (t,x,p), then (40) follows immediately.
We assume in the subsequent steps strict convexity of φ in p at (t,x,p), i.e. there exist δ, η > 0 such that for all z ∈ T ∆(I)(p)
Since φ is a test function for a purely local viscosity notion, one can modify it outside a neighborhood of (t,x,p) such that for all (s,
is convex on the whole convex domain ∆(I). Thus for any p ∈ ∆(I) it holds
We divide the proof in several steps. First we show an estimate which is stronger than (42) basing on the strict convexity assumption (41). In the second step we use the dynamic programming to establish estimates for p. The subsequent steps are rather close to the standard case. We reduce the problem by considering a BSDE on a smaller time interval. Then we establish estimates for the auxiliary BSDE, which we use in the last step to show the viscosity supersolution property.
Step 1: We claim that there exist η, δ > 0, such that for all (t, x) ∈ B η (t,x), p ∈ ∆(I)
By Taylor expansion in p we have for all (t, x, p) ∈ B η (t,x,p)
To establish (44) for all p ∈ ∆(I) we set for p ∈ ∆(I) \ Int(B η (p))
By the convexity of W in p and (44) we have for anyp ∈ ∂W − p (t,x,p)
So we have for all p ∈ ∆(I) \ Int(B η (p))
Assume now that (43) does not hold for a p ∈ ∆(I). Then there exists a sequence (
Thus for k → ∞, p ∈ ∆(I) \ Int(B η (p)) and
which contradicts (45). Note that by (43) we have for any t >t such that (t −t) is sufficiently small and an η ′ < η
Furthermore by Itô's formula it holds
Next, let f : [t, t] × R n → R n be a smooth bounded function, with bounded derivatives. Recall that by assumption B, p c = 0 under any P ∈ P(t,p). So since under P ǫ the process p is a martingale with E P ǫ [p t− |Ft − ] =p, it holds by Itô's formula 
Choosing 0 < ǫ ′ < η ′ and combining (48) with the estimates (49)-(52) there exists a constant c, such that
Since p is a martingale, it holds for all s ∈ [t, t[ E P ǫ |p s −p| 2 Ft − ≤ c(t −t) 
Step 3: Note that under P ǫ ∈ P f (t,p) the triplet (Yt + cǫ which implies (40) as t ↓t since ǫ > 0 can be chosen arbitrary small. Thus by Proposition 4.11., 4.12. and comparison for (8) (see [7] , [5] ) we now have the following result. 
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have shown an alternative representation of the value function in terms of a minimization of solutions of certain BSDEs over some specific martingale measures. These BSDEs correspond to the dynamics of a stochastic differential game with the beliefs of the uninformed player (modulo a Girsanov transformation) as an additional forward dynamic. We used this to show how to explicitly determine the optimal reaction of the informed player under some rather restrictive assumptions. For a generalization a careful analysis of the optimal measure in the representation of Threorem 3.4. is necessary. In the simpler framework of [7] the existence of a weak limit P * for a minimizing sequence is straightforward using [16] . In our case any limiting procedure needs to take into account the BSDE structure. The question of existence of an optimal measure under which there is a representation by a soltution to a BSDE poses therefore a rather delicate problem, which shall be addressed in a subsequent work. ) be defined as in section 3.1. We fix a P ∈ P(t, p) and denote
Let ξ ∈ L 2 T (P), i.e. ξ is a square integrable F T -measurable random variable. Let f : Ω×[0, T ]×R d → R be P ⊗ B(R d ) measurable, such that f (·, 0) ∈ H 2 (P) and such that, there exists a constant c, such that P ⊗ dt a.s.
We Thus δY s ≥ 0 almost surely for any time s ∈ [0, T ].
